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NEWFOUND RELIGION: TERM 17(3) OF THE  
NEWFOUNDLAND ACT AND ITS CHALLENGE TO 
THE CURRENT DISCOURSE ON FREEDOM OF  
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
MARK HEEREMA†
ABSTRACT
Underlying the dominant legal and theoretical approaches to the 
freedom of religion in the public sphere is a discourse which assumes 
that religion is a contestable or mutable aspect of public life.  As a result 
of this assumption, our current approach holds that the role of religion 
PD\EHDOWHUHGDFFRUGLQJWR WKHSHUFHLYHGEHQHÀWVDQGEXUGHQVRI LWV
presence.  The resulting consensus predominately prefers the absence 
of religion in the public space where government regulation exists. 
By amending its constitutional terms of union with Canada to permit 
religious observances in their public school system, Newfoundland and 
Labrador  has protected activities which, short of their constitutional 
protections, would certainly be condemned by our current approach. 
However, denouncing this provision fails to account for the current 
and historical relationship which religion has had in the education of 
the citizens of Newfoundland and Labrador.  The following discussion 
examines this discord, a discord which profoundly challenges whether 
our current approach is based on a faulty premise.  It will be submitted 
that in appropriate circumstance the existence of religion in the public 
sphere should not be challenged, but rather acknowledged and accepted. 
In such cases this acknowledgment of religion may need to form the 
foundation or starting point for our approach to religion.
† Mark Heerema received his LL.B. from Dalhousie Law School in 2005.  While all the views 
expressed remain those of the author, the author would like to acknowledge the help and support 
given by Professor Ronalda Murphy in the preparation of this paper. 
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I. APPROACHING RELIGION IN SOCIETY
Religion has a dual nature in our society. While able to satisfy questions 
RIPHDQLQJDQGSXUSRVHUHOLJLRQFDQDOVRFUHDWHGLYLVLRQVDQGFRQÁLFWV
which may seem irreconcilable. From families to communities to na-
WLRQVUHOLJLRXVGRFWULQHVKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWREHDVLJQLÀFDQWIDFWRULQ
PDQ\GLVSDUDWHW\SHVRIFRQÁLFWV7KLVDVSHFWRIUHOLJLRQEHFRPHVHVSH-
cially challenging when one considers how religion should be regulated 
in those currently regulated public spheres of society, a question which 
the government and the courts must concern themselves with.
In answering this question, courts and theorists have sought to eval-
uate and determine the desired role of religion. What emerges from our 
current approach is the task of ascribing a place for religion based on 
LWVSHUFHLYHGEHQHÀWVDQGEXUGHQVWRVRFLHW\DVDZKROH7KLVDSSURDFK
has predominately concluded that the exercise of religious beliefs in the 
governmentally-regulated public sphere (“public sphere”) of society is 
PRUHKDUPIXOWKDQEHQHÀFLDO5HVXOWLQJIURPRXUFXUUHQWDSSURDFKLVD
consensus that advocates for the absence of religious doctrines in pub-
lic settings. Notably, the current approach operates despite the varying 
degrees to which religion may already exist in the public sphere of a 
particular society.
A fundamental assumption of our current approach is that the exist-
ence of religion in the public sphere is properly considered a contest-
able, or mutable aspect of society. The questions arises: When religion 
appears to be entrenched in the public sphere is it appropriate to con-
sider assigning or re-assigning its place? 
Recent constitutional amendments in Newfoundland bring this chal-
lenge to bear. Through the current and historical ties between religion 
and the education system in Newfoundland, the fundamental assump-
tion underlying our current approach to religion in the public sphere is 
confronted and challenged.
II. NEWFOUNDLAND’S CHALLENGE TO THE CURRENT APPROACH
Term 17(3) of Newfoundland’s Terms of Union with Canada was 
amended in 1998 to constitutionally protect the role of religious observ-
ances in the Newfoundland school system.1 Newfoundland’s unabashed 
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allowance of religion in a public aspect of society seems contrary to 
our current approach to religion in public life; Term 17(3) recognizes 
religion in the public school system when our current approach would 
KROG WKDW WKLV LV LQDSSURSULDWH DQGXQMXVWLÀDEOH7KHGLVFRUGEHWZHHQ
Newfoundland’s experience with religion in education, and the conclu-
sions drawn by the current approach regarding this issue, mandates re-
examination of our current approach.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I will examine the con-
WH[WXDO VLJQLÀFDQFH RI7HUP 9LHZHG LQ OLJKW RI WKH KLVWRU\ RI
the province of Newfoundland, the rationales supporting its enactment 
become apparent. Allowing for religious observances in a school setting 
appears to be consonant with Newfoundland history and the collective 
experience of Newfoundlanders. 
Part II examines our current approach to freedom of religion by 
examining its legal and theoretical underpinnings. Testing Term 17(3) 
against the prevailing jurisprudence and leading theories demonstrates 
not only how this provision would be received, but also exposes as-
sumptions and motivations underpinning the current approach to the 
freedom of religion in Canada.  Term 17(3) will be examined against 
Canadian and American jurisprudence. Generally, the American juris-
prudence appears unsympathetic to the nature of Term 17(3) and would 
condemn it as a violation of the First Amendment to their Constitution. 
In Canadian law the existence of Term 17(3) is more ambiguous. Spe-
FLÀFDOO\WKHYDOLGLW\RI7HUPDSSHDUVWREHIXOO\SURWHFWHGE\WKH
jurisprudence arising from s.93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Never-
theless, as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms increasingly 
follows the American jurisprudence with respect to the freedom of reli-
gion, the spirit of Term 17(3) appears problematic.
In Part III, my theoretical analysis will discuss the dominant theories 
respecting religion in society. In particular, liberalism, deliberative de-
mocracy and non-neutrality will be examined as theoretical paradigms 
addressing the role of religion. A brief review of these paradigms dem-
onstrates how liberal theory is dominating the position of courts on this 
issue. In line with liberalism, courts tend to hold that religion should be 
limited to the private sphere.
1 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, Schedule 21 
as am. by SI/98-25. Term 17(3) reads as follows: Religious observances shall be permitted in a 
school where requested by parents.
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)LQDOO\3DUW,9DWWHPSWVWRUHFRQFLOHWKHDSSDUHQWFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ
RXUFXUUHQWDSSURDFKWRUHOLJLRQDQGWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIUHOLJLRQLQ1HZ-
foundland society. To accede to the spirit of our current approach would 
suggest a necessary reassignment of the role of religion in the New-
foundland public school system. Yet this conclusion seems unsatisfac-
tory considering Newfoundland’s experience with respect to religion 
and education.
Accordingly, an alternative is presented. It will be suggested that 
in appropriate circumstances the issue of religion should not be ap-
proached with a view to determine what role religion should play, but 
rather, with a view to recognize that the degree to which religion exists 
in the public sphere may not properly be contested. Where religion ap-
pears to be entrenched in public life (as it does in Newfoundland with 
respect to education) its acknowledgment should form the foundation, 
or starting point, for any analysis. 
III. TERM 17(3) AND NEWFOUNDLAND
A full appreciation of the context surrounding Term 17(3) is crucial to 
understanding how this constitutional amendment challenges the cur-
rent approach.
1. Newfoundland’s Entrance into Confederation
In 1949, the province of Newfoundland joined Canada, with Terms of 
8QLRQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\UHÁHFWLQJWKHFRQIHGHUDWLRQFRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQ
the Federal Government and the Government of Newfoundland.2 Spe-
FLÀFDOO\7HUPSUHVHUYHGWKHH[LVWLQJGHQRPLQDWLRQDOVFKRROV\VWHP
in Newfoundland.37KLVUHÁHFWHGWKHVWDWXVTXRIRU1HZIRXQGODQG LW
2 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2003 student ed. (Scarborough: Thomson-Car-
swell, 2003)
at 43; See also, the Newfoundland Act, R.S.C. 1985 App. II, No. 32.
3$WWKHWLPHRIDGPLWWDQFHLQWRFRQIHGHUDWLRQWKHIROORZLQJGHQRPLQDWLRQVEHQHÀWHGIURPWKLV
constitutional protection: The Roman Catholic, Anglican, United Church, Congregational, Pres-
byterian, Seventh Day Adventists and the Salvation Army denominations. The Pentecostal As-
sembly was added by Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11, Schedule 21 as am. by SI/88-11.
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was the Church which founded the education system in Newfoundland, 
and which still governed them at the time of Confederation.4 Preserving 
WKH UROH RI WKH&KXUFK LQ HGXFDWLRQZDV D VLJQLÀFDQW LVVXH IRU1HZ-
foundland and was regarded as a crucial aspect of joining Confedera-
WLRQ7KHÀUVW3UHPLHURI1HZIRXQGODQGGHVFULEHG WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI
this issue as follows:
I was terribly conscious of these fears of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Newfoundland, and I was implacably determined to see that the 
terms and conditions of Newfoundland’s union with Canada would 
contain absolute protection of the existing rights of the churches to 
public funds for the operation of their schools. In short, I vowed that 
the status quo should be maintained in the most unalterable way that 
could be found and that this should be covered within the actual 
terms of union.5 
%\HQDFWLQJ7HUPVSHFLÀFDOO\LQOLHXRIVRIWKHConstitution Act, 
1867, it was intended that this constitutional provision would protect 
and insulate the existence of the pre-existing denominational schools.6 
4 See for e.g., John P. McEvoy, “Denominational Schools and Minority Rights: Hogan v. New-
foundland (Attorney General) Case Comment on Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) 
(2001), N.J.C.L. 449. See also R. I. McAllister ed., Newfoundland and Labrador: The First 
Fifteen Years of Confederation (St John’s: Dicks & Co. Ltd., 1964).
5 Joseph Roberts Smallwood, I Chose Canada: the memoirs of the Honorable Joseph R “Joey” 
Smallwood (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973) at 306.
6 Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 constitutionally preserved the existing denomina-
tional school system at the time of Confederation. By standing in lieu of s.93, Term 17’s relies 
on s.93’s constitutional ability to protect its provisions. Part II of this paper will consider this 
issue in greater detail. Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 reads as follows:
93. In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to 
Education, subject and according to the following Provisions: 
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect 
to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at 
the Union: 
(2) All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and imposed 
in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen’s Roman 
Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the Dissentient Schools 
of the Queen’s Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects in Quebec: 
(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient Schools exists by Law 
at the Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal 
shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial 
Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority 
of the Queen’s Subjects in relation to Education: 
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2. The Evolution of Term 17
The constitutional protection of the denominational school system in 
Newfoundland ended in the late 1990’s after a series of amendments. 
Following a Royal Commission and a provincial referendum, Consti-
tutional Amendment, 1997 (Newfoundland Act) effectively reduced the 
role of churches in the governance of the school system by increasing 
government representation on the school boards.7 The 1997 amendment 
did not remain in force for long and, following an unsuccessful attempt 
by the Government of Newfoundland to use this new provision to create 
inter-denominational school boards, another referendum was conduct-
ed.8 Following this referendum, the existing Term 17 was repealed and 
replaced in 1998 by the current Term 17.9
On January 8, 1998, the current Term 17 came into force. It now 
reads as follows:
17. (1) In lieu of section ninety-three of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
this Term shall apply in respect of the Province of Newfoundland: 
(2) In and for the Province of Newfoundland, the Legislature shall 
have exclusive authority to make laws in relation to education but 
VKDOOSURYLGHIRUFRXUVHVLQUHOLJLRQWKDWDUHQRWVSHFLÀFWRDUHOLJLRXV
denomination. 
(3) Religious observances shall be permitted in a school where 
requested by parents.10 
(4) In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time seems to the Governor General 
in Council requisite for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section is not made, 
or in case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any Appeal under this 
Section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that Behalf, then and 
in every such Case, and as far only as the Circumstances of each Case require, the Parlia-
ment of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due Execution of the Provisions of this 
Section and of any Decision of the Governor General in Council under this Section. 
7 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, Schedule 21 
as am. by SI/97-55.
8 The referendum asked whether the electorate would support a single school system with op-
portunities for religious education and observances. 72.7% of the votes supported this, see supra 
note 4.
9 For a more detailed review of the history of Term 17 see McEvoy, supra note 4.
10 Supra note 1. 
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7KHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIWKHFXUUHQW7HUPZDVDIÀUPHGE\WKH1HZ-
foundland Court of Appeal in Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney Gen-
eral).11 The litigants in this case were adherents to the Roman Catho-
lic Church, who advanced several grounds in an attempt to render the 
amendments unconstitutional. Of principle concern for the litigants was 
the collapse of the denominational school system. Cameron J.A., who 
GHOLYHUHGDXQDQLPRXVMXGJPHQWIRUWKHFRXUWDIÀUPHGWKDWWKHDPHQG-
ments were validly enacted pursuant to the amending formula. In addi-
tion, the court declared that the existence of the new Term 17 was im-
mune from Charter review by virtue of standing in lieu of s.93.12 
3. The Legal Effect of Term 17
Effectively, Term 17 now achieves three things. First, Term 17(1) af-
ÀUPVWKDW7HUPVWDQGVLQOLHXRIV6HFRQGO\7HUPFUHDWHVD
non-denominational school system while ensuring the existence of non-
denominational courses in religion. Lastly, Term 17(3) permits religious 
observances in a school where requested by parents. 
Considerable controversy was generated by the creation of a “public 
school” system in a province which historically had only contained de-
nominational schools.13 By protecting the right to have religious observ-
ances, Term 17(3) is fairly seen as an attempt to mitigate this dramatic 
change:
The proposed amendment will enable government to create a school 
system where all are treated equally, where each and every person 
in the Province will be able to participate equally in the governance 
of education, and where all parents will be able to exercise the right 
to access religious education and religious observances for their 
children.14   
11 [2000] N.J. No. 54 (C.A.) [Hogan] leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 
191. See also a case comment on this decision, McEvoy supra note 4. 
12 Hogan, ibid. at para 92. 
13 For many such an amendment was seen as a setback for these constitutionally protected reli-
gious minority groups, for e.g., see “Submissions to the Special Joint Committee on the Amend-
ment to Term 17 of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland” online: The Evangelical Fellowship 
RI&DQDGDKWWSZZZHYDQJHOLFDOIHOORZVKLSFDSGI(GXFDWLRQ1ÁG%ULHISGI!
14 Newfoundland and Labrador, Legislative Assembly, “Education Reform in Newfoundland 
and Labrador” by Roger Grimes available online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
<http://www.gov.nf.ca/releases/1997/edu/Term17.htm> [emphasis added].
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Religion continues to play a central and vital role in Newfoundland life; 
in a 2001 census, only a mere 2.5% of their population declared that 
WKH\KDGQR UHOLJLRXV DIÀOLDWLRQ15  Considering this contextual back-
ground, the right to religious observances contained in 17(3) appears 
quite unremarkable and perhaps a natural corollary to a shift from a de-
nominational school system to a public school system. This may dem-
onstrate why the right to religious observances has garnered little atten-
WLRQ:KLOH7HUPPD\VHHPXQUHPDUNDEOH LWVFRQÁLFWZLWK WKH
current legal and theoretical approaches to religion warrants attention.
Before examining how Term 17(3) would be interpreted by our cur-
rent approach, it is important to highlight some of its salient features. 
Again, it reads as follows:
(3) Religious observances shall be permitted in a school where 
requested by parents.16 
The wording of this provision is extremely inclusive.17 First, “religious 
observances” as a descriptor is exceptionally broad. No qualifying lan-
guage precedes or follows it; it is not, for example, restricted to reason-
able or generally accepted religious observances, but simply “religious 
observances.” Secondly, it is important to note the use of the mandatory 
“shall”. The absence of more contingent language, such as “may”, nec-
essarily implies that religious observances must be permitted if request-
HGE\SDUHQWV7KLUG´UHTXHVWHGE\SDUHQWVµLVDOVRXQTXDOLÀHGDQGEH-
yond having two or more parents in agreement, no limiting standard is 
LPSRVHG/DVWO\DQGRIFULWLFDOVLJQLÀFDQFHLVWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWDWXV
of Term 17. Being part of Newfoundland’s Terms of Union, the right to 
religious observances arises under the Constitution of Canada, a crucial 
factor in its legal interpretation.
15 See Michael Valpy, “Old-time religion gives way to diversity” The Globe and Mail (29 No-
vember 2004) at A6.
16 Supra note 1.
17 )RU DGGLWLRQDO FRPPHQWDU\ VHH%HUQLH%HQQHWW ´¶1R· ODZ\HU FLWHVÁDZ LQQHZ7HUPµ
Telegram (29 August 1997) at 2.
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IV. LEGAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF TERM 17(3)
At present, courts in Canada have not opined to any great extent on the 
existence of Term 17(3).18 Further, there is little by way of academic 
commentary on its existence. Accordingly, this part of the paper aims 
to provide a thorough analysis of the current discourse underlying our 
approach to religion and discuss how it applies to Term 17(3). 
The following analysis will be three-pronged. First, a review of the 
relevant Canadian jurisprudence will be undertaken. Secondly, a con-
sideration of relevant American jurisprudence will be provided to inves-
tigate how a similar provision would be received in the United States. 
Lastly, the current theoretical perspectives on freedom of religion will 
be examined.
1. Applicable Canadian Jurisprudence
i) Introduction
$IXOOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRI7HUPLQ&DQDGLDQODZ
mandates drawing attention to two distinct structures in the Canadian 
Constitution: the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s.93 
of the Constitution Act, 1867. At a basic level, the Charter protects the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of people in Canada, including the 
freedom of religion. Section 93, on the other hand, protects the role of 
existing denominational schools at the time of Confederation. While 
these elements of the Constitution are quite distinct, both are relevant 
to Term 17(3).
ii) Section 93
By protecting the existing denominational school systems in the new 
Canadian provinces, s.93 was one of the primary sites for recognizing 
18$WSUHVHQW7HUPVSHFLÀFDOO\KDVQRWEHHQVXEMHFWWRFKDOOHQJH7KHRQO\MXGLFLDOFRP-
ment to date has been the challenge to Term 17’s general inception into the Constitution in the 
Hogan decision. 
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the role of religion in Canadian society at the time of Confederation.19 
As Term 17 stands in lieu of s.93, s.93 jurisprudence has a direct appli-
cation to Term 17(3).20 
With the adoption of the Charter (and its protection of the freedom 
of religion and the right of equality), it was unclear how the guarantees 
in s.93 would subsist. These speculations were largely answered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Bill 30.21  At issue in this de-
cision was the constitutionality of a bill of the Ontario legislature, which 
proposed to increase funding for Roman Catholic secondary schools. It 
was alleged that this bill supported one religious group to the exclusion 
of others. In upholding the bill the majority of the Court focused on 
the inviolable nature of the historic compromise that s.93 represented. 
Section 93 was enacted to protect existing denominational schools at 
the time of confederation, which included the protection of the Roman 
Catholic education system in Ontario. Wilson J., writing for the majori-
ty, stressed how Canadian courts should strive to give meaning to s.93:
:KLOHGXHUHJDUGPXVWEHSDLGQRWWRJLYHDSURYLVLRQZKLFKUHÁHFWV
a political compromise too wide an interpretation, it must still be 
open to the Court to breathe life into a compromise that is clearly 
expressed.22
2IPRUHVLJQLÀFDQFHLVWKHKROGLQJWKDWWKHCharter is impotent to im-
pinge on the guarantees established by s.93:
It was never intended, in my opinion, that the Charter could be used 
to invalidate other provisions of the Constitution, particularly a 
19 See Elizabeth Shilton, “Religion and Public Education in Canada after the Charter” in John 
McLaren & Harold Coward eds., Religious Conscience, the State, and, the Law (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999) 206 at 206 where the author describes s.93 as being the 
most important “span” of the bridge that joins religion and education. Due to subsequent amend-
ments and differences in the educational systems pre-Confederation, there is a patch work of 
s.93 applicability across Canada. For a review of the differing applications of s.93 across Cana-
da see M.H. Ogilivie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law 
Inc., 2003) at 127-128.
20 Supra note 1, where Term17(1) states, “In lieu of section ninety-three of the Constitution Act, 
1867, this Term shall apply in respect of the Province of Newfoundland”.
21 Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to amend the Education Act (Ontario),[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 
[Bill 30].
22 Ibid. at para 29.
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provision such as s.93 which represented a fundamental part of the 
Confederation compromise.23
After the decision in Bill 30, the Supreme Court faced the subsequent 
issue in Adler v. Ontario of whether the Charter requires equal funding 
for separate schools in Ontario.24 Iacobucci J., writing for a majority of 
WKH&RXUWDJDLQDIÀUPHGWKHLPPXQLW\RIVZLWKUHVSHFWWRCharter 
claims:
s.93 is a comprehensive code with respect to denominational school 
rights. As a result, s. 2(a) of the Charter cannot be used to enlarge 
this comprehensive code. Given that the appellants cannot bring 
themselves within the terms of s.93’s guarantees, they have no claim 
to public funding for their schools.25
The majority judgment clearly acknowledges and accepts that the s.93 
guarantees may not accord with the spirit of the guarantees enumerated 
in the Charter. 'HVSLWHWKLVFRQFHVVLRQLWZDVDJDLQDIÀUPHGWKDWWKH
Charter remains incapable of invalidating another part of the Constitu-
tion, a holding carried forward from Bill 30. This case acknowledges 
that these two components of the Canadian Constitutional structure may 
stand separately despite the tension which apparently exists between 
them.
It appears well settled that s.93, the “historic compromise,” is im-
permeable with respect to the Charter. 26 Borrowing an American term, 
academics have suggested that the rights and guarantees protected by 
s.93 may amount to being “established” and immune to challenge out-
side the context of a constitutional amendment.27
23 Ibid. at para 63.
24 Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 [Adler].
25 Ibid. at para 35. Also see, Gonthier J. speaking for a unanimous court in Reference re Educa-
tion Act (Que.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 511 where he describes s.93 as follows:
Section 93 is unanimously recognized as the expression of a desire for political compromise. It 
VHUYHGWRPRGHUDWHUHOLJLRXVFRQÁLFWVZKLFKWKUHDWHQHGWKHELUWKRIWKH8QLRQ
26 See Iacobucci and Bastarche JJ.’s majority judgment in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 at para 34.
27 M.H. Ogilvie, “What is a Church by Law Established” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 179 at 
188-189.
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iii) The Impact of S.93 on Term 17(3)
Term 17 stands in lieu of s.93. By direct implication it would appear that 
religious observances pursuant to Term 17(3) may not be subject to the 
Charter. It is this component of the Canadian structure (and its judicial 
interpretation) that the Government of Newfoundland relied on when 
drafting Term 17(3).28 
By virtue of the s.93 jurisprudence alone, Term 17(3) may consti-
tutionally allow for any conceivable religious observance. Indeed, the 
breadth of Term 17(3) is seemingly without limits.29 However, this begs 
the question of whether or not this means that any religious observances 
would be allowed. While Christmas pageants and school plays gener-
ally stir little controversy, what about less benign examples? For exam-
ple: What about religious observances portraying subservient roles for 
IHPDOHVZKDWDERXWFHUHPRQLDOGDJJHUVZKDWDERXWDQLPDOVDFULÀFHV30 
or perhaps observances condemning homosexuality?
Quite simply, it is unlikely that courts will not impose some degree 
of limitation on the range of religious observances allowed. Directly or 
indirectly, the most likely source of these limitations will be the freedom 
of religion guarantee included in the Charter.
iv) The Charter
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the freedom of 
religion in s. 2(a) as it states:
28 The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador have posted on their website opinions of 
leading Constitutional scholars, John Crosbie and Ian Binnie, declaring that the Constitutional 
status of 17(3) would render it immune from Charter purview online: Government of New-
foundland and Labrador <http://www.gov.nf.ca/currentevents/referend/excerpt.html>.
See also, Deanna Stoke Sullivan, “Tobin comes to terms with wording” Telegram (26 August 
1997) at 1 where the author states, 
Both Binnie and Crosbie have said the Term would provide Constitutional protection for re-
ligious observances and nothing in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or Constitution could 
invalidate the rights set out in the Term.
29 See Campbell Morrison, “Federal Conservatives shift Term 17 strategy” Telegram (24 No-
vember 1997) at 1 where the author cited the Tory whip, Noel Kinsella who after commenting 
on term 17(3)’s breadth stated, “Newfoundland and Labrador is opening up a Pandora’s box of 
legal challenges”.
30:KLOHDQLPDOVDFULÀFHVPD\VHHPRYHUWKHWRSVHHChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hi-
aleah, 113 U.S. 2217 (1993) a decision of the United States Supreme Court which discusses the 
WUDGLWLRQVRIDQLPDOVDFULÀFHVLQQXPHURXVUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQV
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2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms   
(a) freedom of conscience and religion31
The leading case on this provision is R. v. Big M Drug Mart,32 a 1985 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.33 In this case, which chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Sunday-observance legislation, the Court 
expounded the meaning of freedom of religion. Dickson C.J., writing 
for the majority stated as follows:
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination.34
This oft-cited quote demonstrates that the concept of freedom of reli-
gion has been given an expansive interpretation in Canada.35 A similarly 
wide interpretation can be found for religion. In its latest decision on 
religion, the majority of the Supreme Court described “religion” as fol-
lows:
'HÀQHG EURDGO\ UHOLJLRQ W\SLFDOO\ LQYROYHV D SDUWLFXODU DQG
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to 
involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In 
essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions 
or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally 
OLQNHGWRRQH·VVHOIGHÀQLWLRQDQGVSLULWXDOIXOÀOOPHQWWKHSUDFWLFHV
of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or 
with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.36
The Supreme Court has actively embraced the ability of an individual to 
espouse the religious convictions of their choice. Yet correlatively, the 
31 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11, s. 2(a) [Charter].
32 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M].
33 See Hogg, supra note 3 at 902, where Professor Hogg calls it the “leading case on freedom 
of religion”.
34 Big M, supra note 32 at para 94.
35 See e.g., Syddicat Northwest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46 [Syndicat] at para 40 where 
,DFREXFFL-IRUWKHPDMRULW\DIÀUPV´7KLVFRXUWKDVORQJDUWLFXODWHGDQH[SDQVLYHGHÀQLWLRQRI
freedom of religion”
36 Ibid. at para 39.
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Supreme Court has paired this ability with an inability. Religious free-
GRPHTXDOO\SURWHFWVLQGLYLGXDOVIURPFRHUFLRQLQWRVSHFLÀFUHOLJLRXV
observances:
Equally protected, and for the same reasons, are expressions and 
manifestations of religious non-belief and refusals to participate in 
religious practice.37
What may appear good and true to a majoritarian religious group, 
or to the state acting at their behest, may not, for religious reasons, 
be imposed upon citizens who take a contrary view. The Charter 
safeguards religious minorities from the threat of “the tyranny of 
the majority.38
The court thus emphasizes the correlative right to be free from religious 
indoctrination or compulsion. 
 To restate, the court essentially states: Be what you believe you 
should be, but not in a manner which prevents another from freely de-
termining what they believe.397KLV WLJKWURSHZDON LVGLIÀFXOWDV WKH
court’s enthusiasm appears axiomatically strong for both aspects of the 
right – as we continue to recognize the value of your beliefs, we increas-
ingly see the need to protect your ability to reach your beliefs in a man-
QHUWKDWLVXQLQÁXHQFHGRUXQFRHUFHGIUHHGRPfor and freedom from 
religion.40
v) The Impact of the Charter on Term 17(3)
7KHGLIÀFXOWLHVRIWKLVEDODQFLQJDFWEHFRPHHYLGHQWLQDGGUHVVLQJWKH
role of religion in public education. Considering the dual nature of the 
right, the real issue becomes: Does “freedom of religion” act to pro-
tect religious exercises in education, or does it operate to protect people 
from exposure to religious observances and practices in the classroom? 
37 Big M, supra note 32 at para 122.
38 Big M, supra note 32 at para 96.
39 See R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at para 99 where the paradox is 
described as “freedom to manifest one’s own religious beliefs” and “freedom from conformity 
to religious dogma”.
40 See M.H. Ogilivie, “The Unbearable Lightness of Charter Canada” (2002) 3(2) Journal of the 
Church Law Association of Canada 201.
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The leading decisions on this issue come from the Ontario Court 
of Appeal.41 In separate decisions, the court struck down regulations 
mandating that public schools open or close with some form of religious 
exercise.42 In both decisions the court found the legislation to uncon-
stitutionally impose a pressure to conform on religious minorities. It 
was held that provisions allowing students to be excused from these 
H[HUFLVHVZHUHQRWVXIÀFLHQWWRSURWHFWDJDLQVWWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUUHOLJLRXV
compulsion and coercion. Accordingly, religious exercises such as the 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer were considered unconstitutional. Quite 
clearly, these decisions have drawn a Charter line in the sand – beyond 
mere education about religion, religious exercises should not be permit-
ted in a public school setting. 
It appears well established that the Charter would invalidate any 
law protecting religious exercises in a public school. Any religious 
components which extend beyond education about religion has been 
judicially characterized as including the unconstitutional purpose of 
religious indoctrination or compulsion.437KHVHÀQGLQJVKDYHRSHUDWHG
despite the presence of exemption clauses which have allowed students 
not to partake. 
In the event Term 17(3) was subject to the Charter, it seems almost 
certain that it would be considered unconstitutional under s. 2(a) and s. 
1. Term 17(3)’s acceptance of religious observances extends well out-
side the realm of religious education by allowing devotional activities, 
and despite the presence of statutory exemptions being in place, it seems 
likely that it would easily be ruled unconstitutional.44
41 To date the Supreme Court had not directly addressed this issue.
42 Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th ) 1 
(C.A.); Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.) 
[Zylberberg].
43 See Carol A. Stephenson, “Religious Exercises and Instruction in Ontario Public Schools” 
(1991) 49(1) U.T. Fac. L.R. 82; See also Banafsheh Sokhansanj, “Our Father Who Are in the 
Classroom: Exploring a Charter Challenge to Prayer in Public Schools” (1992) 56 Sask. L.R. 
47 at 50 where the author states, “it becomes evident that the Charter can be a powerful tool for 
opponents of school prayer.” 
44 See Schools Act, 1997, S.N.L. 1997 c. S-12.2 s. 10(1) which states:
Where a student’s parent requests in writing, the principal of a school shall excuse that student 
from participation in a course in religion or a religious observance conducted in the school.
126 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
vi) Term 17(3) - Section 93 and the Charter
In Canadian law, Term 17(3) appears to be a quagmire.  On the one side, 
Charter jurisprudence condemns it, while on the other side, s.93 juris-
prudence defends its existence as the product of compromise. 
Term 17(3) represents a point of uncertainty in Canadian law, and 
resolution will likely depend on the court’s normative assessment for 
future direction. As the jurisprudence seems to intersect, the need to 
choose a direction emerges. In our global world, courts and scholars are 
increasingly turning their attention to foreign jurisdictions for guidance. 
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, leaders in comparative law studies, 
aptly describe the rationale and motivation as follows:
[I]t is clear that the method of comparative law can provide a much 
richer range of model solutions than a legal science devoted to a 
single nation, simply because the different systems of the world can 
offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a 
lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in 
his own system.45
With respect to freedom of religion, it is the American experience that 
informs and shapes Canadian law with the greatest strength.
2. Applicable American Jurisprudence
i) Why the United States of America?
In Big M, Dickson, C.J. seemingly declared that American jurisprudence 
on religion would be of limited relevance to Canadian law:
Recourse to categories from the American jurisprudence is not 
SDUWLFXODUO\KHOSIXOLQGHÀQLQJWKHPHDQLQJRIIUHHGRPRIFRQVFLHQFH
and religion under the Charter.46
1RWDEO\WKHUHDUHVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH´IUHHGRP
of religion” in Canada and the United States which would support Dick-
45 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998) at 15.
46 Big M, supra note 32 at para 105.
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son C.J.’s statement. 47 Some of the central distinctions between our 
constitutional structures are as follows: the protection of “freedom of 
conscience;”48 the protection of multiculturalism;49 the existence of a 
saving provision;50 the existence of the “notwithstanding” clause, 51 and 
ÀQDOO\WKHDEVHQFHRIDQ´DQWLHVWDEOLVKPHQWµFODXVH+RZHYHUGHVSLWH
these differences, and the assertion from Dickson, C.J., it is undeniable 
that American jurisprudence on freedom of religion has been extremely 
LQÁXHQWLDO LQ&DQDGD ,QDGGLWLRQ WRVFKRODUV52 a survey of the major 
freedom of religion cases in Canada clearly indicates a reliance on the 
American experience.53 
It is not surprising that Canada leans on the American experience. 
Despite the differences noted above which would make its blind recep-
tion unthinkable, the similarity of culture and an increasingly diverse 
religious population are common elements of the two societies which 
make American holdings on the subject relevant. In addition, in contrast 
to the Charter’s relatively immature jurisprudence, the American juris-
prudence on freedom of religion is well-established and carries with it a 
long history of development.
ii) U.S. Constitutional Fundamentals
In the United States of America, religion is protected by the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…54
47 See Stephenson, supra note 43 at 88.
48 Charter, supra note 31, s. 2(b).
49 Charter, supra note 31, s. 27.
50 Charter, supra note 31, s. 1.
51 Charter, supra note 31, s. 33.
52 For e.g. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Religion Clauses: Reading the Lesson” (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L.R. 507.
53 For e.g., see Syndicat, supra note 35 where the majority Supreme Court borrowed extensively 
on the American jurisprudence for grappling with objective criterion for religious beliefs; See 
Zylberberg, supra note 42 where the majority and dissenting judgment of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal focused heavily on American jurisprudence; See also R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 
where Wilson J. (the majority on the religion issue), expressly adopts aspects of the “anti-estab-
lishment” jurisprudence.
54 U.S. Const. amend. I. While the First Amendment only addresses “Congress”, by 1947 by 
virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment’s religious 
clauses also bound the “States” as well. 
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Notably within this provision, there are two clauses pertaining to reli-
gion – the “anti-establishment” clause, and “the free exercise clause”. 
Reconciling two clauses that seemingly pull in different directions has 
been a major challenge for courts in the United States.55 The United 
6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWGHÀQHGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHWDVNDVIROORZV
7RÀQGDQHXWUDOFRXUVHEHWZHHQWKHWZR5HOLJLRQ&ODXVHVERWKRI
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to 
a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.56
Courts have mitigated this inherent tension in a few ways. In addition to 
developing common doctrines made applicable to both clauses,57 courts 
have tended to invoke one clause over the other depending on the con-
text. A survey of the major cases involving religion in public schools 
demonstrates that the anti-establishment clause is the clause which 
dominates the court’s attention in this context. 
iii) Philosophical Underpinnings 
Before examining American decisions relevant to Term 17(3), an ap-
preciation must be gained of the philosophies underlying the “anti-es-
tablishment” clause.
First, the anti-establishment clause has been said to mandate a sep-
aration between Church and state. Relying on themes expounded by 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the United States Supreme Court 
has deciphered the intention of this clause to require a “wall of separa-
tion.”58 Functionally, this doctrine requires the state to avoid religious 
involvement and refrain from entering, or appearing to enter, the re-
ligious arena. Government is distinct from the Church. However, this 
judicial interpretation of history has been widely criticized. Some ar-
gue that the drafters never intended this result, but rather intended only 
55 See Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and 
Procedure 3rd ed. Vol 5 (St Paul: West Group, 1999) [Rotunda and Nowak] at 2 where the 
authors describe this pull-and-push relationship as follows, “There is a natural antagonism be-
tween a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice.”
56 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, at 668-669 (1970).
57 See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 2nd ed. (New York: The Foundation 
Press, Inc., 1988) at 1157 [Tribe].
58 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1. (1947).
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that the state should not reach in and regulate religions.59 Despite the 
criticism, the doctrine of separation remains a powerful force in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.
Secondly, the anti-establishment clause has been held to require 
Government neutrality. This principle was clearly stated in Abington: 
´>L@QWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQPDQDQGUHOLJLRQWKH6WDWHLVÀUPO\FRP-
mitted to a position of neutrality.”60 This principle manifests itself in 
different ways, creating a “coat of many colours.”61 For example, gov-
ernment should not favour non-religious organizations over religious 
organizations; government should not favour one denomination over an-
RWKHUGHQRPLQDWLRQDQGÀQDOO\JRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGQRWIDYRXUKROGLQJ
or not-holding religious beliefs. This religion-blind approach remains 
DQLQÁXHQWLDOXQGHUSLQQLQJRI$PHULFDQMXULVSUXGHQFH
Lastly, the anti-establishment clause mandates a position of non-en-
dorsement by government with respect to religion. If the government’s 
actions or purposes can be seen to “favour” or “promote” a particular 
religious belief they will fall afoul of the establishment clause, by un-
constitutionally “endorsing” that religion.62 A secular purpose must un-
GHUOLHJRYHUQPHQWDFWLRQVDQGLWVDEVHQFHZLOOEHVXIÀFLHQWWRFRQGHPQ
it as an endorsement of religion.
Separation of church and state, neutrality and non-endorsement 
shape the approach to the anti-establishment clause. Collectively, Amer-
ican courts refer to this analysis as the “Lemon Test,” a test that incorpo-
rates these philosophies when considering whether a law will be found 
unconstitutional.63
iv) American jurisprudence with respect to Religion in Public Schools
$IXOOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKLV LVVXHÀUVWQHFHVVLWDWHVDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRI
how the United States Supreme Court has guarded public schools from 
59)RUHJVHH6WHSKHQ/&DUWHU´5HÁHFWLRQVRQWKH6HSDUDWLRQRI&KXUFKDQG6WDWHµ
44 Ariz. L. Rev. 293.
60 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 at 226 (1963) [Abington].
61 Steven D. Smith, “Non establishment Under God? The Nonsectarian Principle” (Lecture 
for the Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, University of San Diego School 
of Law Spring 2004) online: Bepress Legal Repository <http://law.bepress.com/sandiegolwps/
pllt/art8>. See also Tribe, supra note 57 at 1188 who describes there being three main forms of 
neutrality, “strict neutrality”, “political neutrality” and “denominational neutrality”.
62 Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 at 764 (1995).
63 Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
130 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
religious activities with an extra sense of diligence. As stated in Lee v. 
Weisman: 
[Religious] exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of 
indirect coercion. The concern may not be limited to the context of 
schools, but it is most pronounced there.64  
The fear of increased coercion in the public school system has greatly 
LQÁXHQFHGGHFLVLRQVRIWKH&RXUW)RUH[DPSOHDV'HUHN+'DYLVKLJK-
lights, it appears quite anomalous that prayers are not allowed in school 
classrooms or at school sporting events, but are allowed in Congress, 
or that the Ten Commandments are not allowed to be posted in a public 
school, yet the Supreme Court Chambers has a portrait of Moses hold-
ing the Ten Commandments displayed on its walls.65
7KHÁDJVKLSGHFLVLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQ
this area is Wallace v. Jaffree.66 In this case, the Court struck down an 
Alabama statute authorizing a one- minute period of silence in their 
public school system “for meditation or voluntary prayer.” The Su-
preme Court determined there to be a lack of secular purpose to this 
statute, as highlighted by the legislative history and the inclusion of the 
word “prayer,” a word deemed to be an inherently religious term. For 
the court, the lack of a secular purpose to this statute axiomatically evi-
denced an attempt to endorse religion, and accordingly the statute was 
rendered unconstitutional.
The Wallace decision closely followed the holding of Abington, 
a 1963 decision of the Supreme Court.67 In Abington the Court ren-
dered unconstitutional the reading of biblical passages in public schools 
despite parents having the option to exempt their children. The Court 
stressed the lack of a secular purpose, and noted that while education 
about religion is permissible, religious devotion is not.68
64 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) at 593 [emphasis added].
65 Derek H. Davis, “Separation Integration and Accommodation: Religion and State in America 
in a Nutshell” 43(1) J. of Church and State 5 at 5.
66 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
67 Abington, supra note 60.
68 Note that the Ontario Court of Appeal in Zylberberg relied on the holding on this case. In Elk 
*URYH8QLÀHG6FK'LVWY1HZGRZ, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) Rehniquist J. at 2319-2320 stresses 
that it is religious exercises which, due to their endorsing nature, cause them to run afoul of the 
First Amendment.
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The impressionable nature of students, peer pressure and the appear-
ance of state-endorsement have been compelling factors for the United 
States Supreme Court in addressing the role of religion in public schools. 
When children are in a public school setting, the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively shielded them from religious exercises, not chancing religious 
coercion despite the presence of exemption clauses. Nowak and Ro-
tunda describe the current state of the law as follows: 
$EVHQW D VLJQLÀFDQW FKDQJH LQ WKHPHPEHUVKLS RI WKH&RXUW WKH
Justices will not accept the argument that government may authorize 
or endorse religious prayers, readings, or teachings in the public 
VFKRROVDVDSDUWRIWKHRIÀFLDOVFKRROGD\RUVFKRROFHUHPRQLHV69 
By way of caveat, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has taken 
a different approach for the use of schools during non-school hours.70 
The use of school buildings during private hours does not, in the Court’s 
perception, present the same dangers. As attendance for “after-school” 
programs requires parental consent, the same coercion concerns are not 
present. Further, as other non-religious organizations are allowed to use 
school grounds, neutrality is preserved, and endorsement avoided. For 
example, in Good News Club the Supreme Court held that allowing a 
religious club to meet after hours at a school did not violate the First 
Amendment:
[W]e have never extended our Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
to foreclose private religious conduct during nonschool hours 
merely because it takes place on school premises where elementary 
school children may be present.71  
v) An American Position on Term 17(3)
In discussing Term 17(3), there is a possible interpretation of the termi-
nology which should be addressed. When Term 17(3) says “religious 
observances shall be permitted in a school”, there is room to argue that 
this refers merely to “a school building after school hours.” If this in-
terpretation were to be adopted, Term 17(3) may be held not to violate 
69 Rotunda and Nowak, supra note 55 at 94. 
70 See Tribe, supra note 57 at 1175.
71 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) at 116 [emphasis added].
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the spirit of the First Amendment. The contextual history of Term 17(3) 
clearly shows that the Newfoundland Government intended religious 
observances to be permitted in schools during the school day.
The purpose of Term 17(3) is to allow requested religious exercises 
to be observed in the public school system during school hours. A sur-
YH\RI$PHULFDQ MXULVSUXGHQFH FRQÀUPV WKDW WKH First Amendment is 
simply unreceptive to such a purpose. Condemnation would be swift. 
Newfoundland’s purpose underlying this Term is not secular, and by 
that virtue alone would be considered an unconstitutional endorsement 
of religion. Further, such observances serve to place the authority of 
the Government of Newfoundland behind the furtherance of sectarian 
goals. Permitting these exercises no longer puts the Newfoundland gov-
ernment in a neutral position with respect to holding religious beliefs, 
but rather, promotes religious devotion. In addition, these observances 
create “bridges” rather than “walls” between Newfoundland and reli-
gion. Exemptions to religious exercises are not a solution to the con-
cerns – the solution is the extrication of them from the Newfoundland 
public school system.
V. THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF TERM 17(3)
As demonstrated, Term 17(3)’s unfettered acceptance of religious ob-
VHUYDQFHVDSSHDUVWRFRQÁLFWZLWKWKHVSLULWRIERWKWKH&DQDGLDQChar-
ter and American First Amendment. As mentioned, the presence of s.93 
jurisprudence (and its protective covering) could insulate this Term. 
Ultimately, courts in Canada will need to determine to what degree 
they will deviate from s.93 jurisprudence and accede to the spirit of the 
Charter and First Amendment. 
In addition to the jurisprudence, courts often consider theoretical 
arguments for guidance. Theoretical approaches form an integral part of 
the current discourse as they often inform and guide the decision mak-
ing process for the courts. In this vein, attention needs to be paid to the 
major theoretical approaches to the freedom of religion. By examining 
these paradigms we not only see which theories hold sway in the courts 
but also gain a greater appreciation for rationales underlying judicial 
decisions.
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Three theoretical paradigms will be examined: liberalism, delibera-
tive democracy, and non-neutrality. In reality, tidy divisions are rare and 
theories and theorists often overlap. Similarly, the legal and theoretical 
analysis is unavoidably intertwined. Here, however, an attempt is made 
to present three fairly distinct views with respect to religion in society, 
and more particularly, religious exercises in public schools.
1. Liberalism
i) Basic Tenets
Understanding liberalism requires understanding its foundational 
SUHPLVH$VRSSRVHGWRDGHÀQHGDQGDJUHHGXSRQWUXWKWKHUHLVQRRQH
path to what is true.72 It is from this basic premise that the theory devel-
RSV%HFDXVHWUXWKLVGLVFRYHUDEOHHYHU\RQHVKRXOGEHIUHHWRÀQGWKHLU
RZQSDWKDQGIUHHWRGHÀQHWKHLURZQ¶JRRG·DQGWKHLURZQ¶WUXWK·$F-
cordingly, policy and polity should not comment directly or indirectly 
on what is the good life, but rather secure conditions which preserve 
the ability of individuals to resolve this in a manner free from external 
interference:
I begin by sketching a simple and straightforward view of liberalism’s 
aims with respective to normative diversity. This simple picture sees 
the role of a liberal legal system as that of providing an ordering 
framework to allow individuals to pursue their freely chosen – and 
H[WUDSROLWLFDOO\GHÀQHG²SXUSRVHV73
According to this perspective, rights in a liberal democracy are intended 
WRSUHVHUYHDVRUWRIOHYHOSOD\LQJÀHOGIRUFLWL]HQVZKRDUHYLHZHGDV
inherently equal, and equally deserving of dignity. Liberalism prevents 
citizens from restricting others from exercising self-determination; in a 
72 This basic claim of liberalism as a philosophical notion often receives little attention. In Paul 
Horwitz, “The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) 
and Beyond” 1996 54 U.T. Fac. L.R. 1 at 4 the author suggests that as a way of interpreting hu-
man existence, liberalism’s claim may be no more deserving of legitimacy than any faith-based 
claim.
73 Stephen Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the 
Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism” (1998) 26(1) Political Theory 56 at 56.
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liberal state, citizens are restrained from actions which directly or indi-
rectly suggest the actor is intrinsically superior to another. 74
ii) Application of Liberalism to Religion’s Role in Society
As a theoretical construct, liberalism is a very broad ideology, and dif-
fering approaches to religion can certainly be entertained within its 
scope.75 However, certain basic conclusions are possible. First, religions 
ZKLFKSXUSRUWWRGHÀQHDQLQFRQWHVWDEOHWUXWKVWDQGLQRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH
foundational premise of liberalism – an express rejection of absolute 
truth. Second, while individuals are fully autonomous to reach their own 
conclusion about the “good life” and develop religious beliefs, they can-
not restrict another’s ability to do the same.76 Religious beliefs and prac-
tices as a private pursuit are quite acceptable, but a line is drawn when 
they have the effect of impinging on others. Further, the state should be 
neutral with respect to religion by refraining from passing judgment on 
the various forms of religion. It is the path of secularism which has been 
held to best equip a state in maintaining its neutrality.77 
Liberal theorist John Rawls expresses a particularly hostile view 
towards religion in public society.78 So long as religious doctrines are 
permitted in society, he argues, they only serve to undermine liberal-
ism by precluding non-believers from attaining an equal sense of dig-
nity. The solution is that in the public sphere, religious doctrines must 
EHH[SUHVVHGDQGFRQYHUWHGLQWRVHFXODUMXVWLÀFDWLRQV8QOLNHUHOLJLRXV
GRFWULQHVVHFXODUMXVWLÀFDWLRQVEDVHGRQUDWLRQDOLW\DQGUHDVRQE\WKHLU
universal nature, are able to include all members of society equally. 
Therefore, when in the public sphere, reliance should be placed prima-
rily on reason and rationality.79
74 Robert Audi, “Religious Values, Political Action and Civil Discourse” 2000 75 Ind. L.J. 276.
75 See e.g. see James Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) where the author attempts to elucidate a more religion-friendly liberal-
ism.
76 This liberal rationale has been repeatedly invoked in Canadian cases, for e.g., see Dickson 
C.J.’s discussion of the freedom of religion in Big M, supra note 32.
77)RUDJRRGUHYLHZRI´VHFXODULVPµVHH,DLQ7%HQVRQ´1RWHV WRZDUGVD5HGHÀQLWLRQRI
“Secular”” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519.
78 See e.g. John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997) 64 U. Chicago L.R. 765.
79 Richard W. Garnett, “Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty” (2003) 
17 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y. 541 where at 546 the author describes the Rawlsian 
view as reserving religious views and convictions solely for the private realm.
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Stephen Macedo, another leading theorist, offers the following de-
nunciation when speaking of the ills of religion-based views and con-
victions in the public sphere:
We have good reason to hope that there will be fewer families raising 
such children in the future.80
Liberalism’s generally less-than-receptive attitude81 toward religious 
convictions in the public sphere is driven by a fear that when religion 
becomes public, it serves to frustrate recognition of the idea that humans 
are equal and equally capable of determining what is best for them-
selves. Religious doctrines are not neutral in respect to this principle 
and, if allowed to run riot, they cast and eventually set those opposed to 
their doctrines and teachings as inherently lesser.
iii) The Liberal View of the Role of Religious Exercises in Public 
Schools
)URPDOLEHUDOSRLQWRIYLHZ7HUPLVÁDZHGRQQXPHURXVOHYHOV
From a liberal perspective, religious exercises in public schools are fun-
damentally problematic. Allowing such exercises promotes a non-secu-
lar and non-reason based epistemology in the public sphere, the effects 
of which serve to denigrate non-believers or non-followers into a cate-
gory of people less deserving of dignity. Furthermore, by allowing such 
observances, Newfoundland would be seen (explicitly and implicitly) to 
take a position on the good life, and thereby jeopardize the individual’s 
ability to do the same. 
2. Deliberative Democracy
i) Basic Tenets
As a theoretical paradigm, deliberative democracy82 holds that episte-
mology and legitimacy may best be dealt with through public discourse 
80 Supra note 73 at 72. Macedo’s harsh line on the role of religion has been heavily criticized. 
81 See Michael W. McConnell, “Why is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom” (1999-2000) 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1243 where at 1244 the author states, “In many circles today, religion is seen 
as an essentially illiberal phenomenon in our public life.”
82 Sometimes also referred to as “discursive democracy.”
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and participation.83 At a basic level, this theoretical approach suggests 
that if conditions for meaningful public participation are created, public 
discourse can lead to a normative consensus and corresponding legiti-
mizing of the resultant legal framework.84 Therefore, for deliberative 
democracy, unlike liberalism, state-endorsed comments about the “good 
life” are permissible so long as they are products of informed public 
participation. Further, legitimizing laws through participation not only 
promotes respect for policy and polity, but also counteracts civil disen-
franchisement and alienation. 
Deliberative democracy places vital importance on meaningful par-
ticipation. Just as only perfect practice makes perfect, perfect partici-
pation is the goal. This type of participation involves two basic com-
SRQHQWV7KHÀUVWFRPSRQHQWLVVHFXULQJWKHULJKWWRSDUWLFLSDWHIRUDOO
citizens.85 The second is to ensure that this participation takes place 
amongst equals. Habermas describes this as the need for “symmetry 
relations,” a condition largely consistent with the liberal conception of 
equal worth and equal dignity.86 In other words, participation for all on 
equal footing.
83 See Frank I. Michelman, “How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A critique of Delibera-
tive Democracy” in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1997) 145 at 149 where Micheleman describes the basic tenets as follows:
“Deliberative democracy”, in sum, I take to be our name for a popularly based system or prac-
tice of fundamental lawmaking that meets a threshold standard of overall deliberativeness. The 
term names a system or practice whose combined organizational, motivational, discursive and 
constitutive attributes are such, we judge, as to qualify its legislative outputs as approvable in 
the right way by all who stand to be affected.
$OVRVHHHJ-XUJHQ+DEHUPDV´%HWZHHQ)DFWVDQG1RUPV$Q$XWKRU·V5HÁHFWLRQVµ
76(4) Denver Law Review 937 at 940 the author provides the following endorsement,
The discourse-approach explains the legitimacy-generating force of the process with a demo-
cratic procedure that grounds a presumption of the rational acceptability of outcomes.
84 See e.g., Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and 
Jurgen Habermas” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1992) 73 at 74 the author states, “The strength of the Habermasian model…is that 
questions of democratic legitimacy in advanced capitalist societies are central to it.”
85 See Habermas, supraQRWHDW$OVRVHH-XUJHQ+DEHUPDV´)XUWKHU5HÁHFWLRQVRQWKH
Public Sphere” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992) 421 at 449 where Habermas states,
7KLVLPSOLHVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIOHJDOSURFHGXUHVWKDWJXDUDQWHHDQDSSUR[LPDWHIXOÀOO-
ment of the demanding preconditions of communication required for fair negotiations and free 
debates. These idealizing preconditions demand the complete inclusion of all parties that might 
be affected, their equality, free and easy interaction, no restrictions of topics and topical contri-
butions, the possibility of revising outcomes, etc.
86 Jurgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights” (1998) 42 Philosophy 
& Soc. Crit. 157 at 169.
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ii) Application of Deliberative Democracy to Religion’s Role in 
Society
/LNH OLEHUDOLVP GHOLEHUDWLYH GHPRFUDF\ FDQ ÀQG DVSHFWV RI UHOLJLRQ
problematic in the public sphere. A similar derision for religious doc-
trines as rationales in public participation as found in Rawls, can be 
found in Habermas:
7KHDZDUHQHVVLVJURZLQJÀUVWRIDOODPRQJWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOVWKDW
one’s own religious truths must be brought into conformity with 
publicly recognized secular knowledge and defended before other 
religious truth-claims in the same universe of discourse.87
Habermas, as an individual theorist, is particularly known for his dis-
dain of religion: “Habermas’s pronouncements on religion offer little 
encouragement to those persons, from professionals theologians, to ob-
servant citizens, who take religion seriously.”88 
However, a deliberative democratic view may also recognize that 
if religions can increase public participation, they may be of value. As 
religions hold the attention of many citizens, engendering them into the 
conversation may correlatively increase the level of public participa-
tion. In fact, notwithstanding Habermas’s thoughts, by including reli-
gions, an inroad may be provided for increased, rather than decreased, 
participation.
iii) Deliberative Democracy’s View of Religious Exercises in 
Public Schools 
'HOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\FDQEHVHHQWRÀQGSRWHQWLDOO\UHGHHPLQJDQG
potentially injurious, aspects of Term 17(3).
Conceivably, Term 17(3) could produce increased levels of public 
participation. With this provision parents may now have an increased 
ability and desire to participate in school governance. Depending on 
how Term 17(3) is administered, it may provide and create new sites for 
parents to discuss with each other, and school administrators, what ob-
servances shall be provided, what should be provided, and why. Indeed, 
87 Ibid. at 169.
88 See Brian J. Shaw, “Habermas and Religious Inclusion: Lessons from Kant’s Moral Theol-
ogy” (1999) 27 Political Theory 634 at 637.
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one could easily imagine ways in which Term 17(3) could be admin-
istered to potentially raise participation, and create meaningful delib-
erations. Problematically, Term 17(3) provides no such procedural or 
implementational guarantees, and increased participation may only be 
incidental to it, but legally speaking, not required. 
Similar to the concern of liberalism, deliberative democracy may be 
concerned with the propagation of religious doctrine and rationales in 
the public sphere. A Habermasian view would reject religious doctrines 
as being an unacceptable part of public participation and, from this point 
of view, any promotion of religion may be troubling.
3. Non-Neutrality
i) Tenets of “Non-Neutrality” and its View of the Role of Religion 
in Society
7KHÀQDOWKHRUHWLFDOSDUDGLJPWKDWZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHGLQWKLVSDSHUZLOO
be referred to as non-neutrality. This approach is less prescriptive than 
it is reactive as it largely responds to liberalism’s allegedly neutral treat-
ment of religion.
At a general level, this perspective challenges the contents of the 
prescribed public and private spheres in society. In particular, it rejects 
the liberal banishment of religious convictions into the private realm 
and, alternatively, welcomes religious beliefs and convictions into the 
public sphere.
The rationales advanced for promoting and allowing religion into 
the public sphere vary. Perhaps most frequently asserted is that anything 
less derogates the role, value and importance of religion in people’s 
lives. Stephen L. Carter characterized the perceived dangers of keeping 
religion in the private sphere when he stated:
The great risk lying a bit further down this path is that religion, far 
from being cherished, will be diminished, and that religious belief 
will ultimately become a kind of hobby: something so private that it 
is as irrelevant to public life as the building of model airplanes.89
89 Stephen L. Carter, “Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby” (1997) 
Duke L.J. 977 at 978.
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A non-neutralist approach would suggest that by preferring to keep reli-
gion in the private sphere, liberalism implicitly passes judgment on the 
quality of religious convictions – if you want to believe in that, that’s 
ÀQHEXWZHZLOOQRWOHW\RXJHWLQWKHZD\RI´UDWLRQDOµWKRXJKW90 Ac-
cordingly, liberalism’s neutrality towards religion is seriously called into 
question.91 Members of society with religious convictions are said to be 
left in a bind; if they want to join the “public arena,” they must check 
their religious hang-ups at the door, and grab the how-to-be-rational 
binder on the way in. Non-neutralism asks: By keeping religion private, 
how many people are we keeping out of the public space?
Adherents to this approach would stress that society needs to accept 
that rationality and reason are not the only modes of existence. Humans 
are not machines. Humans believe in things they cannot see, cannot 
prove, or cannot rationally articulate, but that should not render them 
less worthy of public contribution.92 
While non-neutrality has railed against liberalism’s cold shoulder, 
DQGKDVGHPRQVWUDWHG OLEHUDOLVP·VGHÀFLHQFLHV VROXWLRQV VHHPVFDUFH
ZLWKQRPDMRUFRPSUHKHQVLYHDOWHUQDWLYHVÀQGLQJVXSSRUW
ii) Non-neutrality’s Approach to Term 17(3).
As stated above, non-neutrality as a paradigm is largely a response to 
liberalism and by that virtue offers little criteria for how to assess initia-
tives. 
Yet assuredly this approach embraces how Term 17(3) permits re-
ligion to enter the public arena. Term 17(3) legitimizes the role of reli-
gious observances, and helps take such manifestations of belief out of 
WKHFORVHW,WLVQRWVRPXFKZKDW7HUPVSHFLÀFDOO\SHUPLWVRUHQ-
90 See Horwitz, supra note 72 at 64 where the author states:
Given liberalism’s emphasis on “the rational, empirical, and factual,” the more ethereal virtues 
of religion, and the still more inexpressible call of religious duty, are all too liable to be shrugged 
aside as individual values and choices that must give way to secular progress.
91 See e.g., Steven D. Smith, “The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the Law 
of Religious Freedom”, (Lecture for the Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
University of San Diego School of Law Spring 2004) online: Bepress Legal Repository <http://
law.bepress.com/sandiegolwps/pllt/art8> where the author clearly argues that liberalism’s claim 
of neutrality should be seen for what it is: a non-neutral view of religion which attempts to sup-
press it into the private sphere.
92 See e.g., Ogilivie, supra note 40 at 231.
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dorses, but rather the underlying recognition of the relevance of religion 
in Newfoundland which this paradigm embraces. 
VI. CURRENT DISCOURSE AND CHANGE
1. Content of the Current Discourse 
While the preceding three theoretical paradigms offer distinct approach-
es and prescribe different ends, it is liberal theory that has held the at-
tention of the courts with respect to freedom of religion; it is liberalism 
that dominates the discourse underlying our current approach to religion 
in public society.
Through the First Amendment and the Charter, the Supreme Courts 
in the United States and Canada have attempted to minimize the pres-
ence of religion in the public sphere. A clear example of this can be seen 
in how the courts have strived to keep religious beliefs out of the public 
school system. The rationale underlying these holdings has been a genu-
ine fear of religious coercion and compulsion.
,WLVGLIÀFXOWWRGHQ\WKDWUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVKDYHRIWHQEHHQLQYRNHG
in support of patently unacceptable acts, from restricting equal partici-
pation to widespread persecution and even, in extreme circumstances, 
genocide. Courts rightly look with disdain upon such effects, and in 
largely adopting a liberal view to equality and equilibrium, they have 
acceded to liberalism’s sense that religions, through irrational and mys-
WLF MXVWLÀFDWLRQVSHUSHWXDWHDSXEOLFVRFLDORUGHULQJWKDWE\YLUWXHRI
not being rationale or reason-based, is unfair to all citizens. In good 
faith, courts have attempted to preserve equal conditions by assigning 
UHOLJLRXVGHYRWLRQVREVHUYDQFHVDQGMXVWLÀFDWLRQVWRWKHSULYDWHVSKHUH
Yet, as noted by non-neutralists, this approach has had the practical ef-
fect of limiting the role of religion in the public space.93
2. Deconstructing the Current Discourse
Understanding how we approach religious freedom requires understand-
ing the nature of the basic question underlying it. As discussed above, 
93 See Part II of this paper.
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what underpins our current approach to religion is a simple question: 
What role should religion should play in society? A fundamental as-
sumption underlying this question is that the role of religion is contest-
able. By embracing such a philosophical assumption the current dis-
FRXUVHDGRSWVDPDQGDWHGHVLJQHGWRÀQGWKHDSSURSULDWHUROHDQGSODFH
of religion. 
Accordingly, the discourse underlying our approach to religious 
freedom presupposes that the role of religion may be altered. However, 
the propriety of this is challengeable where its existence in the public 
sphere is entrenched, a possibility that Term 17(3) forces us to address.
3. Term 17(3) and the Newfoundland Experience
Term 17(3)’s brazen and unabashed permittance of religious observ-
ances appears almost comical. The provision is so broad and so inclu-
sive of religion that it appears to be totally out of step with our current 
approach to religion. 
Yet, when Term 17(3) is considered from the context of the New-
foundland experience it becomes apparent that our current approach’s 
GHQXQFLDWLRQRI LW IDLOV WR VXIÀFH&ORVHWLQJ UHOLJLRQ VLPSO\GRHV QRW
accord with the past and present attitude of Newfoundland with respect 
to religion and education, as 97.5% of the population of Newfound-
ODQGFODLPVVRPHW\SHRIUHOLJLRXVDIÀOLDWLRQ94 A close nexus between 
religion and education has always existed in Newfoundland. From pre-
Confederation until present, religion has served to be an integral part of 
WKHHGXFDWLRQRILWVFLWL]HQV,WLVWKLVUHDOLW\WKDWFDXVHVUHÁHFWLRQ
Through Term 17(3), Newfoundland calls into question the founda-
tion on which the current approach is based. Underlying Term 17(3) 
and the Newfoundland experience is a profound and subtle testimoni-
al holding that religion and the education of its citizens are indelibly 
OLQNHG7HUP UHÁHFWV WKH H[LVWHQFHDQG UHOHYDQFHRI UHOLJLRQ LQ
Newfoundland society.
By protecting religious observances in their school system, New-
foundland offers an interesting approach to religion in the public sphere. 
:KLOHDSXEOLFOLIHZLWKRXWUHOLJLRQPD\VSDUHFRPSOH[LWLHVDQGÁDVK
points, banishing them from public recognition is an inadequate solu-
94 See Valpy, supra note 15.
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tion. The ability of religion to bind together, or conversely, divide, be-
VSHDNVLWVLPSRUWDQFHJHQHUDOO\EXWPRUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHVLWV
presence and relevance in the lives of people. By amending its terms of 
union, Newfoundland has not so much answered how to solve these in-
herent tensions, but rather has demonstrated that what is more important 
LVWRHQDFWODZVZKLFKUHÁHFWWKHZLOORIFRQVWLWXHQWVKRZHYHULUUDWLRQDO
or undesirable this may be from a governing point of view. 
This explicit acknowledgement of religion calls for a shift in the 
current discourse respecting how religion in the public sphere is ap-
SURDFKHGLQVLPLODUVLWXDWLRQV:KLOHQRWVSHFLÀFDOO\UHMHFWLQJRUDGRSW-
ing any theory, it simply seeks to advance the conversation from what 
should the role of religion be to an acceptance that the role of religion 
may not properly be considered contestable. Conceivably, in Newfound-
land our attention should not be directed at the desired role of religion, 
but rather, at accepting its reality in public and private lives. 
An acknowledgment of this kind resonates with other aspects of our 
society as well. Elements that divide humanity should not, for their di-
visive nature alone, be abolished or suppressed. On a parallel level to re-
ligion, divisions of race, gender and class operate in society. In contrast 
to our current approach to religion, any suggestion which would attempt 
WRGHÁDWHWKHVHGLYLVLRQVWRWKHSULYDWHVSKHUHZRXOGRQO\DSSHDUUHJUHV-
sive. Rather, by fully acknowledging the existence of these divisions in 
society, the discourse has progressively focused on how to best proceed 
within the acknowledgement that divisions like class, gender and race 
operate in all facets of life.
4. Shifting the Discourse – Theoretical Implications
The starting point of any theory should be reality. Accepting religions 
as comprising part of public and private reality may require theorists to 
further grapple with a divisive element of human life. While this may 
EHGLIÀFXOWWKHRULHVFDQQRORQJHUEHH[HPSWRQWKLVEDVLVDORQH6KLIW-
ing the discourse in this manner does not answer or alleviate some of 
the harms religion may cause when left unfettered. Without question, 
governments will need to be vigilant in promoting respect for diversity 
and tolerance of others. 
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By shifting the discourse to recognize that the place of religion is 
not properly contestable in all situations, the theories and jurisprudence 
PXVW UHÁHFW WKLV FKDQJH7KH FKDOOHQJH OLHV DKHDG DQG WKH IROORZLQJ
comments on the application of this recognition with respect to the ma-
jor theoretical approaches merely represent a work-in-progress.
By accepting that neutrality can co-exist with the presence of reli-
gion, liberalism can adapt to this discourse shift. As demonstrated by 
a review of the case law, as a philosophical notion neutrality has been 
invoked to support the absence of any religion. Yet, logically, neutrality 
can equally exist in a climate which recognizes religions. Perhaps an 
example best captures the essence of this point. A school may be neu-
tral by refusing all sports programs, but could also retain their neutral-
ity by equally supporting all sports programs. Accordingly, the liberal 
desire to create equal conditions and equal opportunities does not have 
to be jeopardized by recognizing the existence of religion. Liberalism 
FDQVWLOOÀJKWWRHQVXUHHTXDORSSRUWXQLWLHVUHVSHFWDQGGLJQLW\IRUDOO
religious beliefs. Viewed in this light, we see that Term 17(3) may be 
appropriate. It does not support only one religion, or promote one-type 
of religious observances, but rather aims to provide equal opportunity 
and conditions. 
Deliberative democracy strives for increased participation and le-
gitimacy. By accepting and welcoming that humans may enter this are-
na with religious convictions, the potential for increased participation 
exists. Forums designed to gain increased participation and produce 
legitimation are hampered when restrictions are placed on their admit-
tance. Undoubtedly corralling religious doctrines into the conversation 
PD\SUHVHQWÁDVKSRLQWV+RZHYHUWKHIDFWUHPDLQVWKDWSHUPLWWLQJWKHLU
SUHVHQFHEHWWHUUHÁHFWVWKHUHDOLW\RIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
For non-neutralists, this discourse shift would represent the desired 
acknowledgment of religion’s status in public life. While not professing 
an easy road ahead or a simpler society to come, recognition of religion 
represents a validation of religious beliefs, both private and public.
5. Shifting the Discourse – Legal Implications
As Part II demonstrated, in Canadian law Term 17(3) has a precari-
ous existence between the jurisprudence of s.93 of the Constitution Act, 
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1867 and s. 2(a) of the Charter. Yet, by shifting the discourse on religion 
in appropriate contexts, judicial interpretations of these sections must 
also change. 
While the s.93 jurisprudence has traditionally focused on its con-
tractual nature (e.g., “historic compromise”), re-characterizing and em-
SKDVL]LQJ LW DV D UHÁHFWLRQRI WKH H[LVWHQFH DQG UHOHYDQFHRI UHOLJLRQ
may provide a more forceful normative foundation for the existence 
of provisions like Term 17(3). By consciously referring to s.93 as an 
explicit recognition of the relevance of religion, no longer does s.93’s 
purported defence of Term 17(3) seem technical or legalistic, but rather 
quite appropriate.
A shift in the discourse would necessarily require the courts to re-
visit their interpretation of s. 2(a) of the Charter. Ultimately, the shape 
and format of such a change is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Nevertheless, s. 2(a)’s re-interpretation must proceed from the acknowl-
edgement that in appropriate cases the place of religion in the public 
sphere should be considered immutable. The primary implication of this 
acknowledgment would operate to restrain courts from resigning reli-
gion to the private sphere only.
VII. CONCLUSION
Term 17(3) has not been fully challenged in a court of law. Considering 
the dominant legal and theoretical discourse underlying our current ap-
proach, Term 17(3) will remain under tremendous pressure. 
Our current approach to the freedom of religion appears to lead to 
the banishment of religious observances from the public school system. 
This conclusion is possible when we assume that the role of religion is 
properly considered to be alterable according to the positive or negative 
effects religion has on society.
Yet, by enacting Term 17(3) according to their experience, New-
foundland prompts us to re-visit an assumption of our current approach. 
Perhaps there are instances where challenging the role of religion is not 
appropriate; perhaps religion simply exists in Newfoundland. Proceed-
ing on this recognition would be a preferable manner for the discourse 
to proceed. 
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The desire of the current discourse to ascribe religion to the private 
sphere is understandable; religions are divisive, messy and hard to regu-
late. Nevertheless, while it may be easier if they did not exist, no longer 
can we assume that such a result is possible. 
Failing to appreciate the immutable existence of religion may prefer 
WKHRU\RYHUUHDOLW\DQGDFFRUGLQJO\VDFULÀFHWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIKXPDQ
existence for theoretical ease. By proceeding with our current approach, 
blind to the reality it ignores, we only serve to impose on societies like 
1HZIRXQGODQGDQDUWLÀFLDOH[LVWHQFH
